evilsoup wrote:Passive chipping is absolutely nothing like the holocaust.
lol thanks for that stunning insight
Are you insane?
No, really, are you insane? You're the one who made the comparison to the holocaust in the first place. Now, when someone points out that your comparison is ridiculous and only hampers conversation, you go, "Well... duh!" like you couldn't understand how anyone could make that comparison. Do you have the attention span of a goldfish regarding shit you just said?
You know what, fuck you. The rest of your post actually brings up decent points, but I've decided actually getting to them isn't worth wading through your trolling bullshit. Congratulations, your attempts at being a cool and edgy troll have successfully shut down communication, enjoy your superior debate skillz, oh extreme warrior of flame.
As other people have stated, the security problem doesn't come from the ID card in itself, but from a system where in general all one really need to do business in your name is an ID number that can be easily memorized by anyone. It's not something that will be fixed just by an ID card, however sophisticated it might be. The solution would need to see deep institutional reforms at all layers of the administration in how people's identities are handled in the administrative processes.
That's also my main argument behind chipping. A lot of ID fraud happens on the data-storage end of things, people getting unauthorized access to databases using fraudulantly obtained IDs. The thing is, the initial obtaining of those IDs involves stealing or copying the physical objects that display the ID, namely cards and the like. And a lot of the difficulty with proving fraud and rectifying the issue come with the fact that if you've lost those cards, you can have a hard time proving you're genuinely person (x), not the one who stole your card and is abusing it in your name.
With a chip, at least that end of things becomes a hell of a lot harder to screw up. You can lose cards, or have them stolen, and have a hell of a time trying to get things back in order when you suddenly have lost the means to prove that you're actually who you claim to be. With a chip, it's a lot harder to do that, you could forget your wallet at home, have your SS card and drivers license stolen, lose your birth certificate in a house fire, whatever, they can still pass a scanner over your arm and go, "Oh yeah, you're definitely person (x)".
It's not foolproof, of course. I'm sure technology would rapidly be developed so that fraudulent chips could be made, black-market scanners could go out so that ID-thieves could start getting peoples' ID numbers just by surreptitiously waving them around crowd subway cars. But this just calls for better enforcement on the administration end, just like with cards today. Make it so that 'official' uses of ID only take place in well regulated scenarios, tie peoples' ID with photographs, thumbprints, DNA samples, whatever so that in the case of fraud there are redundant backups to prove that you're you, not that other person with a fraudulent chip. Restrict access to the databases so that only authorized users can get in from certain locations, and they can only pull up information about you directly relating to their own jobs.
I'll admit, all of this applies equally to chipping and standardized cards. My contention is that chipping is just a few extra layers of security, both against intentional fraud and against the random chance of cards getting lost and/or destroyed.