ATTN: ARTEMAS

[Aaron]

I think I mentioned before that my father was in Cyprus in 72/73 and the Turks gunned down his buddy right in front of him and he couldn't do anything, by the time he would have got his mag out and C1 loaded they would have shot him as well.

That's peacekeeping.

[starku]

what, that peacekeeping is good?

obviously i exaggerated, but most people in the west are pretty content to leave it at "peacekeeping is good and we should do more of it", without considering whether or not it is likely, or able, to solve anything

its also pretty popular to just accuse the us if things turn sour

in canada, there was even a while in the 90s where it became pretty popular to just think that the role of the cf could be played by a gendarmerie

of course i guess it depends on whether the people you're getting these opinions from are internet people

yeah tbh i don' tthink many people actually think about what stuff like 'sending in soldiers to another country and doing stuff' actually means

and not jsut the sort of people who think the un shoudl have an army and conquer countries

regualr people as you say just seem to think 'send in peacekeepers = fix problem' somehow

and i don't know anyone irl who doesn't get that there's a whole shitload of legal questions around anything an international body does

guess i don't know enough realpolitik

[artemas]

I think I mentioned before that my father was in Cyprus in 72/73 and the Turks gunned down his buddy right in front of him and he couldn't do anything, by the time he would have got his mag out and C1 loaded they would have shot him as well.

That's peacekeeping.

yeah, and cyprus is held up as a success

[Aaron]

Yup. And no one ever notices that if the Turks hadn't just stopped the invasion on their own that the whole island would have been overrun.

Cause there was no way for the UN to stop them.

[starku]

And y'know why should there have been

The conflict between bkack helicopter paranoia and the conception of the un as a strongman is a lol

[Aaron]

Its just kind of a wtf if your there to keep the peace but your basicly relying on the good will of the participants.

[starku]

Well that's the difference between mediation and whatever and 'nation building' or comquest

I mean nobody would let un humanitarian missions in if they'd hot up the place and messed with the regime

[artemas]

well thats the funny thing

peacekeeping only happens if the host country want you there

sometimes having a bunch of blue berets in your way IS enough to keep the peace

[starku]

On the other hand, expecting it to stop anyone who simply doesn't care about condemnation or opinion or whatever is naive in the extreme

[artemas]

yeah, its whats called the mogadishu line, or chapter 6.5 peacekeeping

and its where it all falls apart

[starku]

I don't get why decisinmakers even expect it to be different

I mean it's one thing if you're really just there for humanitarian aid

But if you're really trying to change something, and the country has an attitude that is intractable, don't send the un

[artemas]

well, the problem is that so much of the legitimacy for international law is vested in the un

but the un has only two speeds: chapter VI and VII (peacekeeping and Korean War)

and due to the consensual nature of peacekeeping (and the un) its hard to really organize things

and unilateral stuff everyone hates

EDIT: meant to come back to this

its really hard to get enough actors to pitch in, and due to the decision-making processes (especially in the democratic west, which are heavily time-dependent ie elections), getting a whole bunch of people to actually pitch is a bit of a blue moon-type event. it happened with kosovo, but its pretty rare; the amount of effort and treasure, as well as risk is something that few countries want to get involved in. the few countries left over feel that because they are paying the most (in fiscal, military, political capital, and risk) they should be the ones to control what goes on, like the americans. doing peacekeeping is low risk for the countries involved, and allows a convenient deniability in "it wasnt our op, ask the un".

the importance of multilateral efforts should not be overlooked, as it often develops a "might as well join in, everyone else is and it costs little" attitude. but because of the consensual nature of the un, its hard to organize, and most of the countries joined up for political points. which means that the fluid changes in rules of engagement that a single unified command might experience, just dont happen in un ops, partly because the roe is actually enshrined in the authorizing legal document. and if it took 6 months just to get the damn thing signed, then how long (or if) do you think you'll get a roe change through. the structure of the organization ensures that the mission will always be behind the times. but its the structure of the organization that allows for any decision to be made at all.

[thejester]

man I gotta have a rant

A Better War by Lewis Sorely is one of the worst books ever written on the Vietnam War, and that is some fucking effort. Here is a typical Sorely argument:

- Gen Abrams decides to undertake the following initiative

- it is awesome

- I back this up by quoting Gen Abrams! Also maybe one of his staff officers.

- In conclusion, fuck Westmoreland.

That the guy is taken seriously baffles me.

[thejester]

artemas

keep up that good shit bro

[artemas]

sorry buddy, now that shep and abyss has taken up the torch i feel like i'm no longer needed

if only my simple arguments could stand in for the multifaceted and morally complex narratives of those august persons

[thejester]

every hellfire stops another 9/11 but simultaneously creates the potential for 10 more

I call it the paradox of the Sheppard's Abyss

[thejester]

also random Vietnam post after a fun day in the archives

An incident at Long Dien in early November illustrated the present lack of reliability of the RF and PF. An ambush was sent out from the District Post, accompanied by an American officer and a signaller. At about 2200 hours on 8 Nov 69, the ambush was sprung prematurely on a VC patrol. The VC immediately counter-attacked the ambush, and half the ambush force fled while half stayed. After a few minutes, the remaining half disappeared. Meanwhile, at District Headquarters, the District Senior Adviser, the District Chief and the Task Force Liaison Officer gathered about 20 RF/PF together as a reaction force. Unfortunately, these three became separated from the RF reaction force and, when the District Chief, who had been carrying a megaphone, called on the VC to Chieu Hoi, all three were severely wounded. It is clear that night operations require a degree of fortitude, practice and skill that the RF/PF in Phuoc Tuy have not achieved.

Note that this was in late 1969, after 1ATF has been in Phuoc Tuy for over three years and training the RF/PF for most of that time

[zhaktronz]

every hellfire stops another 9/11 but simultaneously creates the potential for 10 more

I call it the paradox of the Sheppard's Abyss

Cluster hellfires

Time for a cold one